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 Learning from the Past? Why ‘Creative Industries’ can hardly
be Created by Local/Regional Government Policies
Rolf Sternberg
Aus der Vergangenheit lernen? Warum ,Kreative Branchen‘ kaum durch
lokale/regionale Politiken kreiert werden können
US regional economist Richard Florida has developed simple, but very popular ideas to foster
regional economic growth: attracting and haltening of members of the so-called ‘creative class’
by steering the focus of local government development policies for culture, tolerance (towards
ethnic and other kinds of minorities) and knowledge. Members of the creative class, character-
ised by indicators of talent, technology and tolerance, should feel at home in the cities – the
result of which would be that creatives either stay in the city where they already lived before or
move to those cities which possess the named characteristics. The larger the number of creative
people in a city, the better the economic performance of the city. Why that? Because, as Florida
postulates, creative people produce economic value added for the region where they live as they
more often (than non-creative people) start successful firms and more often engage in high-
growth sectors of the economy. Furthermore they are assumed – as an aggregate – to be able to
attract existent firms: ‘jobs follow (creative) people’ instead of ‘people follow jobs’ to cite an
old, but – thanks to Florida – still modern debate among economists. As Florida in his own
empirical studies focuses on U.S. metropolitan areas only, there is a need to close the significant
research gap in terms of empirical evidence outside the U.S., given the great popularity of his
ideas among policy-makers outside the U.S. In the paper five of Florida’s main hypotheses are
discussed in an explorative approach based upon the available literature. None of these hypothe-
ses receive sufficient support. Consequently, it will hardly be possible to create creative indus-
tries by developing related government policies. Comparing government policies in favour of
creative industries with government policies of former eras (when, e.g., clusters or high-tech
regions belonged to the targets of such policies) there is not much empirical evidence that policy-
makers are able or even willing to learn from previous experiences – and failures.
With 1 Figure and 1 Table
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1. Introduction
Euphoria about creative industries can be felt
throughout economic and cultural policy:
National, regional and local governments think
that by supporting creative people, creative in-
dustries and even creative clusters they can re-
vive national, regional and local economies (cf.
DCMS 2009, Arge 2009). They do this even
though many important theoretical problems re-
lating to the concept of the ‘creative class’ upon
which their approach is based have not been resolved
and empirical findings are either lacking or even
point in the opposite direction (cf. Hansen and
Niedomysl 2009, Martin-Brelot et al. 2009).
Similar to the situation with the cluster concept,
policy is rushing ahead of scientific findings:
Florida’s ‘creative class’ concept, particularly
his conclusions for economic policy, has attract-
ed much criticism within the scientific commu-
nity, but this has not damaged its popularity
among local policy-makers (cf. Peck 2005).
Florida (2004) defines the so-called ‘creative
class’ with the help of occupation-based regional
aggregates, i.e., growth rate of patents per inhab-
itant (technology), share of inhabitants with
bachelor degrees (talent), and a mix of melting
pot, integration, boho and gay index (tolerance).
He breaks his ‘creative class’ down into the super-
creative core (scientists, higher education),
creative professionals (education, management,
healthcare) and bohemians (artists). As a result he
assigns about 30 % of the workforce in U.S. met-
ropolitan areas to the ‘creative class’. Florida’s
central idea (2002a,b, 2004, 2005a,b) assumes
that when selecting a location, companies in
knowledge-intensive sectors in particular are at-
tracted by the presence of certain groups of pro-
fessions, the members of the ‘creative class’ de-
fined above. According to this hypothesis, com-
panies and therefore jobs follow the existing la-
bour. This has, according to Florida, a direct and
positive influence on the economic prosperity of
a region: The more creative people live in a region,
the stronger the regional economic growth. In prin-
ciple, every region has the chance to reposition it-
self in the competition of regions, for “the crea-
tive age is a wide-open game. No single country or
region has a lock on it” (Florida 2004: xxiii).
The aim of this paper is to develop arguments
supporting the proposition that creative regions
can seldom by created by explicit government
policies. Politicians could potentially learn
from the previous two mantras of local/regional
economic policy, which is why they are brief-
ly outlined here. The goal cannot be to subject
creative economic policies to an evaluation
according to efficiency and effectiveness
criteria – which would certainly be necessary
after a few years. The mantra is still too young
for that; but this paper does include references
to an ex-ante assessment.
The concern of this paper is not solely academic.
In times of highly indebted public budgets,
careful consideration should be given to how and
with what expectations taxpayers’ money should
be spent – and scientific analyses can be of
assistance in this. This is not changed by the fact
that creative-economy support policies, com-
pared to the instruments of the earlier mantras
of local economic development policies, are
comparatively cheap (Peck  2005).
This paper does not relate explicitly or
exclusively to the German scene, particularly as
empirical research on creative-economy support
policies in Germany still is very much in its in-
fancy. At the same time, however, there is a cer-
tain concentration on German regions and cities,
as these are the areas the author knows best.
Many features of creative-economy support pol-
icies are at least similar in Western European
countries since Florida developed his concept
and marketed it virtually perfectly.
This paper demonstrates that important
theoretical assumptions of Florida’s concept of
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the three Ts are at least empirically contested
(mobility of creative people, causal nexus be-
tween creative sector and economic prosperi-
ty, openness of the target groups to policy pro-
grammes), hence the warning against backing
the same horse in an all too one-sided, uncriti-
cal and homogenous fashion in all places – and
therefore repeating the mistakes of the past.
The same applies as with earlier mantras: Gov-
ernment policy cannot achieve these ambitious
economic goals (at least not everywhere), the in-
flationary use of the same concept in too many
(and therefore also many unsuitable) places gen-
erates unfavourable image effects for the (in
some places undoubtedly sensible) concept and
in places where the goal (in this case, the goal
of establishing a significant creative sector) is
achieved, this rarely has anything to do with
explicit government policies aimed at doing so.
Three mantras of local/regional economic
development policy over the past three decades
can be identified and are presented in Figure 1
in ideal-typical and stylised form. A more or
less congruent sequence of the support of high-
tech industries since the beginning of the 80s,
of public support of sectoral-regional clusters
a decade later and the current focus on creative
industries can be demonstrated using indices
such as the number of scientific journal articles,
publications in general, public-policy pro-
grammes and government subsidies. There are
certainly chronological overlaps: The Dortmund
Technology Park, for example, celebrated its
25th anniversary in 2010 and made an essential
contribution to the development of a truly high-
tech economy in the middle of an old-
industrialised region. Cluster policies are most
definitely not out of fashion in 2010 either.
There are also overlaps in terms of conceptual
content: In some places business incubators are
instruments of cluster policies and clusters are
being considered for creative industries, too
(‘creative clusters’). By the same token, the
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Fig. 1 Three mantras of local/regional economic development policies since the 1980s
Drei Mantras lokaler/regionaler Wirtschaftspolitik seit den 1980er Jahren
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Item Mantra of local economic development policy 
 High-tech regions, 
high-tech industries 
Regional-sectoral cluster Creative industries, 
creative regions 
National and regional 
framework condition 
(economic, political) 
Decrease of relocation 
potential, focus on 
knowledge-intensive 
products, innovation 
orientation 
Increasing interregional and 
interfirm competition 
(global level) 
Social turn in economics: 
Increasing relevance of non-
economic determinants of 
economic development, cuts 
in public budgets 
Aims and motivations 
of policy actors 
Support of SMEs and 
of new innovative 
firms, endogenous 
regional development 
Support of firms located in 
cluster industries, focus on 
specific industries (not 
necessarily high-tech 
industries) 
Support of creative people, 
SMEs, new firms, 
combination of urban 
development policies and 
economic development 
Instruments of local 
economic development 
policies (selection) 
Business incubators, 
programmes to support 
innovative SMEs, 
technology transfer 
support programmes 
Network support 
programmes, 
µFOXVWHUSODWIRUPV¶, cluster 
contests at the federal level 
Project support, loans, new 
firm foundation, local music 
scenes, contests, subsidies for 
experts, support for selected 
focus industries 
Actors of local 
economic development 
policies 
Public development 
agencies and mayors, 
partly in PPP schemes 
Public development agencies, 
often in co-operation with 
private firms 
Culture managers, only 
partially local economic 
development agencies 
Spatial levels of policy 
intervention 
(supranational, 
national, regional, 
local) 
Mainly local/regional, 
at the beginning also 
supranational and 
national 
Mainly regional, sometimes 
national and supranational 
Mainly local, but national 
impact as well (UK!) 
Role models (regions) 
and multipliers/ 
accelerators (selection) 
Silicon Valley, Sophia 
Antipolis, Cambridge 
Science Park; Peter 
Hall, Ann Markusen 
Baden-Württemberg, Silicon 
Valley; Michael Porter  
Silicon Valley, Austin, 
Seattle and many others; 
Richard Florida 
Theoretical foundation Flexible production 
and specialisation, 
industrial districts, 
industrial development 
paths, innovative 
milieu, long wave 
theory  
3RUWHU¶V diamond: firm 
strategy, factor conditions, 
related/supporting industries, 
demand conditions 
Agglomeration theory, 
social network theory 
Basic theoretical 
assumptions 
Synergy effects of spa-
tial agglomeration of 
new technology-based 
firms, spatial immobil-
ity of high-tech firms 
and start-ups 
Spatial proximity within 
cluster leads to increase of 
productivity, of innovative 
capacity and of new firm 
foundation  
Spatial mobility of creative 
people, their preference of 
tolerant cities; gays more 
creative than others; creative 
people a condition for 
regional economic growth 
Empirical validity of 
these assumptions 
Given at places with 
necessary conditions 
Valid in several clusters, but 
not every cluster generates 
positive effects only  
Still a research gap: few 
interregional comparable 
empirical studies 
Causal nexus: policy 
instruments and 
empirical evidence? 
No: most high-tech 
regions emerged 
without explicit policy 
support 
Loose only: most cluster 
policies have not (yet) 
generated clusters  
To be researched: most 
government policies are 
too young 
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attention of economic policy has clearly shift-
ed away from high-tech regions and clusters
towards creative-economy support policies.
This paper is structured as follows. The next
chapter develops a framework that makes it pos-
sible to analyse the current and previous two
mantras of local/regional economic develop-
ment policies. The question of the extent to
which political players can exert an influence is
central to the considerations. Chapters three and
four deal with high-tech regions (with business
incubators as the most popular instrument) and
sectoral-regional clusters. The analysis concept
developed in chapter two is applied here. The
central aim is to explain briefly the foundations
of the creation of the mantras themselves, the
creation of the high-tech regions and clusters,
and any causalities between the two phenome-
na. Chapter five investigates the emerging man-
tra of creative industries. Differences between
and parallels with the two previous mantras as
well as any learning effects among politicians
are also addressed. Based on these findings,
chapter six develops arguments against the abil-
ity of government policies to create creative
industries/creative regions. The conclusions
present hypotheses on the ability of local eco-
nomic politicians to learn and identify potential
areas for future research.
2. Methodological Approach
This paper uses existing theoretical, empirical
and political literature on creative industries and
political support of them and tries to draw con-
clusions regarding the ability of creative indus-
tries to be created (by government policies). It is
primarily explorative in nature, i.e., it is not based
on the author’s own primary data, for example on
the effectiveness and efficiency of government
policies to support the creative economy. This kind
of data cannot be used from an outside source,
either, as creative economy policies – not only in
Germany – are too young to be able to be subject-
ed to ex-post evaluation, particularly with suffi-
cient empirical evidence. Therefore, a different
course has to be taken. Analysis criteria are
developed and used for this paper which makes it
possible to describe and evaluate the three most
recent mantras of local economic development
policy with regard to the question at hand. This
analysis framework consists of 11 items that are
described in the following and used in the subse-
quent three chapters and supplemented with em-
pirical findings (see Tab. 1).
The economic and political framework condi-
tions at the time of the development of the new
mantra are among the important determinants
that influence the mantra itself and the regional
development. Completely different local eco-
nomic development policies are developed un-
der national and regional economic conditions
marked by unemployment, demographic
change and tight public funding than in regions
with an abundance of well-paid jobs, a (rela-
tive) lack of highly qualified labour, a growing
population (based upon a surplus both of births
and inward migration) and public budgets that
are not (highly) indebted. These – admittedly
exaggerated – extremes may be symbolised in
Germany by some districts in the Ruhr area or
in East Germany on the one hand and by the
Greater Munich region on the other. These
framework conditions influence both the nature
(and the impact) of any local economic devel-
Tab. 1 Characteristics of three most recent mantras of local/regional economic development policies
(Source: Sternberg 2011: 225f., modified)  /  Merkmale der drei jüngsten Mantras lokaler/
regionaler Wirtschaftspolitik (Quelle: verändert nach Sternberg 2011: 225 f.)
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opment policies and the respective regional
economic growth in general.
The goals and motives of local economic poli-
cy actors are linked in part to the aforemen-
tioned aspect. Policy-makers’ actions are driv-
en by political-economical considerations;
they want to be (re-)elected and therefore have
to generate support for their actions among vot-
ers and within their own party. They can make
use of these goals with various instruments (see
below). The ability of local/regional econom-
ic politicians to act is influenced to a consid-
erable extent by budget-related framework con-
ditions. In times of tight public funding, low-
cost instruments are more popular with all
groups (parties, other politicians, voters) than
very cost-intensive instruments.
At the instrument level, local economic poli-
cy in principle has the entire range of secto-
ral policy instruments at its disposal (cf. for
example the overview given by Stimson et al.
2002, Pike et al. 2006). The instruments dif-
fer particularly in terms of the intensity of
their intervention and their goals, but also in
terms of their costs, their periods of applica-
tion and their target groups (companies vs.
private, large companies vs. small vs. start-ups,
knowledge-intensive vs. others).
In principle, all those involved in economic
policy and the organisations they represent
(ministries, offices etc.) may potentially be
considered actors in local economic develop-
ment policy. In most cases, these actors are
from the public sector, part of the public-private
partnership strategy, but more recently also in
cooperation with private or commercial actors.
The relevance of private/commercial commit-
ments within local economic development pol-
icies can have a considerable impact on their
success, although the evaluation of that success
by commercial actors and publicly financed
economic politicians may differ.
The aforementioned actors of public creative
economic policy can act on four principal spatial
scales: the supra-national level (e.g. of the EU),
the national level (federal government), the
regional level (federal state or larger metropoli-
tan areas) and the local level (counties/districts).
The creative-economy policies each pursue sim-
ilar goals and in some cases make use of similar
instruments, but at the same time are rarely
coordinated beyond the scope of the spatial scales.
If the role of government policy in the emergence
of creative industries in certain urban areas is to
be evaluated, the multi-level problem has always
to be resolved, or at least documented (for paral-
lels to cluster policies see Sternberg et al. 2010).
Experience of new economic policy strategies
in many countries has shown that the impetus
in terms of content often comes from abroad.
Foreign (regional) role models and/or forward
thinkers were and still are often used to develop
strategies more or less adapted to the local
situation. When these role models or their multi-
pliers/accelerators come from a country whose
economic development long served as the role
model to beat all others – such as the United
States – this makes it considerably easier to boost
acceptance in one’s own country, which is
important to the economic politicians responsible.
This argumentation can also be applied to the
theoretical foundations underlying the new
mantra. A good local economic development
strategy has a solid theoretical foundation – just
as a good theory must always stand up to practical
implementation. The intensity and nature of the
relationship between policy and the related
theories are an important aspect of analysis, and
the speed of diffusion of a new instrument in the
scientific world and in the world of practition-
ers in particular may be relevant (see Kiese’s
(2008) ‘mind the gap’ argument).
Central assumptions regarding the economic
impact may be derived (ex-ante) from the
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theoretical foundations of the economic devel-
opment policies and from the empirical evi-
dence of this theory. For example, spatial prox-
imity plays an important role in all three of the
mantras dealt with here and the related theories,
as do other dimensions of proximity to a cer-
tain extent (Boschma 2005).
The empirical validity of these assumptions,
derived from ex-post assessments of the relevant
theories and the government policies based upon
them, is the litmus test, but this test is not easy to
perform, methodologically speaking. A key
question for the subject of this paper is whether
the postulated causal nexus between a (success-
ful) political instrument and regional economic
prosperity can be demonstrated empirically. This
is where several of the aforementioned steps of
analysis come together. To answer the question
of whether creative-economy policy has contrib-
uted in any given region to the creation of a
creative industry of a significant scale and with a
certain sustainability, it is precisely this causal
nexus that has to be analysed. An illustrative ex-
ample: The Dortmund Technology Park is with-
out doubt the most successful example of a tech-
nology park in Germany – but this has not made
the entire Dortmund region a high-tech region on
an international scale; on the other hand, the no. 1
high-tech region in Germany, the Munich re-
gion, also has a business incubator/technology
park that has not been without success, but
which has at best only  marginally contributed
to the success of this high-tech region (see
Sternberg and Tamásy 1999 on the reasons be-
hind the success of this region).
3. High-Tech Regions as the
Mantra of the 1980s – 1990s
Around the beginning of the 1980s local
economic development policy in several west-
ern industrialised countries changed radically.
Due to the drastically falling potential for firm
relocation (both on a global and on a national
scale), the mobility-oriented regional policy
aimed at the acquisition of branch plants, which
had dominated by then, became less important.
The rise of innovation-oriented regional policy
(Ewers and Wettmann 1980) began, according to
which regional policy in an industrialised country
such as Germany could also concentrate on its
comparative advantages: orientation towards
human capital with the goal of offering
innovative, high-tech products and services on the
global market. (Regional) policy has to develop
corresponding infrastructures and policy
programmes to support this goal. Another para-
digm shift within the economy also had to be tak-
en into consideration: away from focusing on
large firms and their branch plants, and towards
small and medium-sized enterprises, in particu-
lar new firms (start-ups) (the key, at the latest
since David Birch’s thesis in 1987, was ‘small
is beautiful’). The assumption at the time was that
start-ups, which are always young and mostly
small, as well as SMEs in general, had a great
number of potential advantages in the innovation
process compared with incumbent firms (flexi-
bility, openness to innovation), but enjoyed ex-
plicit support from government policies due to
other comparative disadvantages (financing, pow-
er) in combination with market failure.
Silicon Valley in northern California was (and
still is) the regional role model of a high-tech
region. Hordes of policy-makers from all
countries and of all political colours descended
to learn how a high-tech region could be creat-
ed. It was assumed virtually without question that
the economic success of this formerly agricul-
tural region was (at least in part) a result of pol-
icy. The titles of relevant scientific publications
supported these politicians in their actions (cf.
for example Miller and Côté 1987). Other schol-
ars emphasised on the other hand that Silicon
Valley was not the result of an explicit econom-
ic or technology policy (Sturgeon 2000, Stern-
berg 1998). Nor did the Stanford Industrial
300                                                Rolf Sternberg                                       DIE ERDE
Park – established in 1951 and neither the first
nor the most successful science park in the Unit-
ed States – contribute to the rise of Silicon Val-
ley; rather did it benefit from the rise of the re-
gion which was already under way. Nevertheless,
policy played a role in Silicon Valley, not as an
explicit local economic development policy
aimed at promoting the region, but as an unintend-
ed effect of national technology and military pol-
icies of the Department of Defense (DoD) and
NASA (Sternberg 1996). Their massive R&D in-
vestments in California and their R&D labs at
research-intensive universities, particularly in the
Bay Area, were decisive factors in the genesis of
Silicon Valley, its universities and its new firms.
But of course that was not an explicit goal of NASA
and the DoD. That goal was to safeguard techno-
logical progress and national security.
Largely untroubled by these findings, in many
countries business incubators and technology
parks became the instrument with which high-
tech regions could supposedly be created. The
launch of the Berliner Innovations- und Gründer-
zentrum (BIG; Berlin Business Incubator) in
Berlin in 1983 was followed by numerous other
projects within a few years, supported by
programmes of the federal government (only for
a short time), federal states and local
governments. Sternberg et al. (1996) docu-
mented 120 facilities in the first Germany-wide
assessment of business incubators; the ADT (Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Technologiezen-
tren – association of German technology cen-
tres) alone currently counts at least 158 ‘inno-
vation centres’ among its members while about
300 ‘innovation centres’ in the broadest sense
exist in Germany (Baranowski et al. 2010).
Business incubators are in no way limited to high-
tech regions; they are particularly common in ru-
ral and formerly industrial regions (such as
North Rhine-Westphalia) where local econom-
ic politicians liked to join in the race to become
the most dynamic city and sometimes awakened
totally unrealistic expectations. Business incu-
bators are an ideal instrument of this era that fit-
ted with the role model of the high-tech region:
focus on young technology-based firms, spatial
concentration of start-ups, clear local ties, fo-
cus on SMEs, endogenous potential (most of the
founders of new firms come from the same re-
gion and stay there even after they have outgrown
and left the business incubator). The logic was
simple: A business incubator helps many start-
ups to survive and grow, and these start-ups then
collectively create an economically prosperous
high-tech region. After almost 20 years of sci-
entific research on business incubators, the
empirical reality of course now looks different
(e.g., Aerts et al. 2007, Támasy 2007, Stern-
berg et al. 1996, Schwartz and Göthner 2009).
There are few economically successful business
incubators that have become self-supporting and
therefore independent of public funding. In Ger-
many, Dortmund is doubtless one such posi-
tive – but far from representative – example.
Even in cases where the business incubators
are successful according to their own (often
unverifiable) criteria, they have not created a
German Silicon Valley – which never was a
realistic expectation, but, however, one which
some local politicians cherished. Two notes
should be added. First, business incubators
may have been the most popular instrument of
the regional/local economic development pol-
icy of this mantra aimed at creating high-tech
regions, but they were not the only instrument.
Programmes such as the federal EXIST pro-
gramme to support start-ups from universi-
ties, or ‘Science City Ulm’ had very similar
intentions. Second, it should not go unmen-
tioned that business incubators still exist to
this day (even if only a few are now being new-
ly established) and many of them have shown
a longevity not expected by many critics at
their birth. Nevertheless, this instrument, the
associated paradigm and the associated hopes
for a high-tech region – are consigned to the
past as the framework conditions as well as the
scientific debate have changed.
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4. Clusters as the Mantra of the 1990s
until the Middle of this Decade
Regional-sectoral clusters are clearly
inseparably linked with the name of Michael
Porter. Two decades ago (1990) he stressed in
his bestseller ‘The competitive advantage of
nations’, which did not focus on the regional but
on the national level, that the interdependent
relationship between factor conditions, demand
conditions, related/supporting industries and
firm strategies and national competition explains
the global competitiveness of national indus-
tries. Later Porter (1998) changed the perspec-
tive from national to regional, arguing that
regional-sectoral clusters increase the compet-
itiveness of the related regions and the firms lo-
cated there. Since then the cluster concept has
been extremely popular among policy-makers
and practitioners thinking about the promotion
of innovative capabilities and economic growth.
Defined by Porter himself (1998: 197f.) as
“geographic concentrations of interconnected
companies, specialised suppliers, service
providers, firms in related industries, and
associated institutions (for example, universi-
ties, standards agencies, and trade associations)
in particular fields that compete but also coop-
erate”, clusters are widely regarded as a panacea
for national, regional and local competitiveness.
Starting with its conceptual fuzziness, the clus-
ter concept also received a fair share of academ-
ic criticism (see, for example, Martin and
Sunley 2003). However, academic dissatisfac-
tion has yet failed to undermine the widespread
enthusiasm of consultants, politicians and
economic development practitioners for
clusters, although many interpret Porter’s
cluster idea in very simplified terms – a further
parallel with the previous mantra.
With the continuing popularity of cluster
promotion, it is often overlooked that the most
shining cases of successful spatial concentra-
tions of industry emerged and grew without
explicit government intention (Bresnahan and
Gambardella 2004, Braunerhjelm and Feldman
2006). Of over 800 clusters identified worldwide
in the Harvard Business School’s Cluster Meta
Study, only one emerged through a public
initiative (van der Linde 2005, see Sternberg et
al. 2004 for a similar argument). Therefore, it is
now widely accepted that governments can only
create favourable conditions for the emergence
of clusters and facilitate their growth and
restructuring once they have emerged (see also
Fornahl et al. 2010). Such cluster policies can
be defined as ‘efforts of government to develop
and support clusters in a particular region’
(Hospers and Beugelsdijk 2002: 382). Their
high degree of public agency sets them apart from
business-led cluster initiatives in which cluster
firms assume centre stage, while government
and/or the research community only play a
supportive role (cf. Sölvell et al. 2003).
For cluster policies, structural and institution-
al differences between nations and regions still
imply that a one-size-fits-all cluster policy is
hardly feasible, the same as for other local
development strategies (see Bristow 2005,
Tödtling and Trippl 2005). Furthermore,
cumulative and path-dependent learning-by-
doing in policy and practice contribute to
persisting variety not only in the interpretation
and application of the cluster concept, but also
in the rationales and goals of cluster policies.
Cluster policies emerged at the interfaces of
formerly isolated policies, especially science
and technology policy, industrial policy and
regional policy which converged into an amal-
gam like regionalised innovation policy (see
Sternberg et al. 2011, for a comparison of U.S.
and German cluster policies). While cluster
policies are clearly helpful by integrating
previously separate fields of policy and
increasing a region’s organising capacity by
overcoming intraregional competition to create
multi-stakeholder alliances, there is a strong
need for independent evaluation of cluster
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policy processes and their impact. The very first
results of an econometric and innovation-
oriented evaluation of Bavaria’s cluster
offensive show that the likelihood of becoming
an innovator in the target industries, together
with access to external know-how, cooperation
with public scientific institutes, and the
availability of suitable R&D personnel
increased for firms in the cluster while R&D
expenditures decreased significantly for firms
in target industries (see Falck et al. 2010).
5. Creative Economy as the new Mantra –
Parallels with, and Differences from, Previous
Mantras, Learning Effects among Politicians?
Creative industries and policies to support them
are without doubt the new mantra of local eco-
nomic development policy – not only in
Germany. There are parallels with the previous
mantra: The driving force who markets his idea
and himself perfectly comes from the United
States, was already a respected scientist, albeit
only within his field, the scientific community
is discussing his idea intensively and mostly crit-
ically, and policy is using the concept faster and
less critically than would be in line with
academic debate. The concept of the ‘creative
class’ provides development policy with
solutions that are supposedly simple to
communicate, easy to implement and ‘need not
be especially costly’ (Peck 2005: 749).
Florida’s main idea (2002a,b, 2004, 2005a,b),
shortly described in the introductory chapter of
this paper, is based on his “3 T’s”, i.e. technolo-
gy, talent and tolerance, and on occupation-
orientated regional aggregates divided into
scientists, higher education, education, manage-
ment, healthcare, artists. Many European aca-
demics criticise the all too generous and random
definition of the creative sector, e. g. Pratt
(2005: 33): “It would be difficult to identify a
non-creative industry”. When aggregating the
creative people to a creative region (character-
ised by an above-average share of creative
individuals or industries) several methodologi-
cal issues arise: thresholds between creative and
non-creative regions, absolute vs. relative
measures, aggregation issues (individual vs.
industry vs. regional creativity). A clear
operationalisation of the creative sector/indus-
tries is needed, however, otherwise the whole
concept would be limited to pure marketing and
assertation. Still, the ‘creative economy’ is
extremely heterogenous, a very fuzzy concept
(Pratt 2005, Markusen 2006). To date the
definitions of what a creative industry is vary
enormously, even within a country. In Germany,
the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs de-
fines creative industries at the national level as
companies that are primarily profit-oriented,
concerned with the creation, production,
distribution and/or media dissemination of
cultural/creative goods and services. According-
ly, the cultural and creative economic sector
encompasses eleven core industries or sub-mar-
kets: music industry, book market, art market,
film industry, broadcasting industry, performing
arts market, design industry, architecture
market, the press, advertising industry and soft-
ware/games industry (cf. BMWi 2009: 3). The
delimitation of the ‘creative class’, particularly
the delimitation between the competing concep-
tual cultural vs. economic perspective and be-
tween cultural industries and creative industries
(cf. Uricchio 2004), and the sometimes fuzzy
conceptualisation of government policies re-
main problems for empirical research, however.
Not all of Florida’s hypotheses are really new.
The idea that talent (human capital) and
technology (knowledge-intensive industries) are
important to regional growth has never been
disputed, at the latest since the advent of the first
mantra of high-tech industries. Glaeser (1994)
showed that a strong urban concentration of
qualified labour exerts considerable positive ef-
fects on regional growth – which in turn pro-
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motes the (intra- and interregional) exchange of
knowledge between highly qualified people
(Storper and Venables 2004). Works by Jacobs
(1969), for example, or the Lund School on the
selection of domicile by highly qualified people
(Andersson 1985; later Törnqvist 2005) dem-
onstrated early that this called not only for
agglomeration economies but also for cultural
(‘soft’) location factors and a certain diversity
and urbanity. The new aspect of Florida’s con-
cept of the 3 Ts is predominantly based on a
broader definition of the ‘creative class’ that
goes beyond the traditional concept of human cap-
ital and emphasises the decisive role of creativity
(and not simply formal qualifications) in region-
al growth. According to Florida’s theses, spatially
very mobile creative people migrate to those re-
gions and cities with low barriers to entry and
where the environment is tolerant, i.e., open to
minorities. Knowledge-intensive companies for
their part locate in places preferred by creative
people (i.e. ‘jobs follow people’). The resulting
question about the effects creative people have on
regional economic growth has so far not been
adequately answered, neither empirically nor
theoretically (cf. Section 6 for more detail). In
addition to the mobility of creative people, the
central assumptions in Florida’s concept of the
‘creative class’ also include the growth-support-
ing effect of the ‘creative class’, the rise in the
quality of life and comfort in urban quarters as
a result of the inward migration of bohemians
(Florida and Mellander 2010), which largely
ignores negative aspects such as gentrification,
To date there are scarcely any scientific,
empirically based assessments of the effects of
the numerous efforts of national, regional and in
particular local governments to create or promote
creative industries (cf., however, Ebert and Gnad
2006 on the Ruhr Area). This is understandable,
taking into account the mostly young age of these
activities. However, the very limited number of
policy evaluation studies reveals disappointing
results (Jayne 2005). Florida offers supposed-
ly simple solutions for local development poli-
cies: “I like to tell city leaders that finding ways
to help support a local music scene can be […] far
more effective than building a downtown mall” (-
Florida 2004: 229). Thus: the creativity ‘script’
for policy-makers is simple, cheap and not very
controversial (among policy-makers).
Along with some support (for example, Marlet
and Van Woerkens 2007, Rutten and Gelissen
2008), Florida has mostly received criticism
from the scientific community for his hypothe-
ses. This is another parallel with the triumph of
Porter’s cluster idea among local politicians.
This criticism relates in particular to the robust-
ness of the theory (Glaeser 2004, Storper and
Scott 2009), the empirical validity (for example,
Hansen and Niedomysl 2009) and its implemen-
tation and implementability in local creative-
economy policy (cf., for example Peck 2005,
Jayne 2005, Galloway and Dunlop 2007).
6. Arguments Against the Ability of Creative-
Economy Policies to Create ‘Creative Regions’
The first two mantras show various parallels with
the current mantra, for example the lack of clear,
operationalised definitions, a certain kind of ar-
bitrariness in the definition of the central terms,
an overlapping in terms of industries and regions,
and the relevance of SMEs and entrepreneurship.
Two of these parallels are particularly relevant to
this paper and have so far only been discussed for
creative-economy policies at a very elementary
level. First, empirical research shows that the
existence of either a high-tech region or a
regional-sectoral cluster does not automatical-
ly mean regional economic growth. Conversely,
high-growth regions do not have to be high-tech
regions or have regional-sectoral clusters. Sec-
ond, the existence of corresponding explicit
economic policies to support high-tech regions
or clusters is neither a necessary condition nor
a sufficient condition for the emergence and
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growth of a high-tech region and a cluster. Ac-
cordingly, the following questions, which are to
be answered empirically, are raised both for
creative economies and related economic pol-
icies: Can a region prosper economically with-
out having (a disproportionately high number
of) creative industries and creative people?
And: can a creative-economy policy create cre-
ative industries and creative regions, or are the
corresponding policies even a precondition for
their emergence and growth?
This section answers these questions in
conjunction with the discussion of five hypothe-
ses that can be derived either explicitly or implic-
itly from Florida’s publications. Three of these
hypotheses are indirectly related to government
policies (they relate to the effects of creative
industries that government policy would like to
achieve) and the remaining two are directly linked.
I shall begin with the first three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Creative people are more spa-
tially mobile than other gainfully employed
people and prefer regions with strengths in the
areas of technology, talent and tolerance.
According to the ‘creative class’ concept,
creative people are particularly interregionally
mobile and have high and very specific require-
ments of a location (e.g. great importance of
amenities in the target region), as Lee et al.
(2004) show for selected U.S. regions. There
are, however, no empirical findings on these
processes as a comparative approach for German
regions or most regions outside the United
States. There are a few more recent empirical
studies of the spatial mobility of highly qualified
people who, as we are aware, have a considerable
overlap with creative people, but also differ
significantly from the bohemians. A careful
résumé of these papers shows that technology
and talent have a certain significance as pull
factors in the migration of highly qualified
people, though tolerance does not (cf. Moeller
et al. 2009). Haisch and Klöpper (2007) do
show for Basel that creative people prefer to live
in local areas with low taxation rates and high
levels of tolerance. However, they obviously did
not move into these areas because of specific
locational characteristics (like high levels of
tolerance). Creative people influence the loca-
tional factors rather than responding to existing
locational characteristics (for example by in-
ward migration). As Martin-Brelot et al. (2009)
show, at least for Europe, Florida’s hypothesis
overestimates both the spatial mobility of the
‘creative class’ and the role of soft factors while
‘personal trajectories’ are completely disregard-
ed. Hansen and Niedomysl (2009), employing
Swedish survey and register data, were not able
to find empirical support for Florida’s theoret-
ical arguments about the mobility of the ‘crea-
tive class’: migration rates of the ‘creative class’
are almost the same as for other groups. Migra-
tion of the ‘creative class’ takes place just after
finishing university and its locational choice is
determined by job availabilities but not by place
characteristics like a high proportion of gays or
a high level of tolerance among the local
population. On the basis of surveys among the
artist scene in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Markusen
(2006: 1938) also doubts the significance of
locational factors: “I have suggested that the at-
tractiveness of certain cities for artists is not
the result of atomistic responses to amenities
but, rather, is shaped by investment decisions
that cities, states and funders make in artistic
space and organisations”. Finally, Scott (2010)
emphasises that migrations of highly qualified
people (he uses data for engineers) are mainly
based upon job opportunities and that amenities
are totally irrelevant – except for retired engi-
neers or engineers that are close to retirement
for whom warm winters were a relevant migra-
tion determinant.
It is obviously not sufficient to simply use so-
cio-economic data aggregated at the regional
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level to address the problem fully. The problem
of the causes of the migration of creative peo-
ple requires further-reaching empirical research
and, in parts, other methods that make it possible
to determine the geographical and social trajec-
tories of creative people and the dynamic dimen-
sion. Social network analysis (cf. Beckert 2005;
Degenne and Forsé 2004) and the analysis of
transnational communities and new kinds of cos-
mopolitism (Tarrius 2000) represent potential
methodological alternatives. So far, it has not
been possible to confirm the aforementioned
hypothesis unambiguously.
Hypothesis 2: The specific spatial mobility of
creative people has positive economic effects
on the migrants’ target regions (‘jobs follow
people’ rather than ‘people follow jobs’)
Migrations of highly qualified knowledge car-
riers, both inward and outward, influence the
development potential within a region by
controlling work as a factor of production both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Conversely,
however, successful knowledge-based regional
development can also influence the attraction of
highly qualified labour and therefore act as a
stimulant of migration. This very old debate of
‘jobs follow people’ versus ‘people follow jobs’
is currently enjoying a revival as a result of Flor-
ida’s postulation of the ‘creative class’ (Flori-
da 2002a,b, 2004, 2005a, Steinnes 1982 and
most recently Storper and Scott 2009, Hoog-
stra et al. 2005, Hansen and Niedomysl 2009).
(At least) two aspects give rise to doubts about
the validity of the hypothesis that creative peo-
ple (and the regions they migrate to) act as pull
factors for companies that relocate there for that
reason and therefore bring jobs to the region.
First, bohemians and artists, i.e., the proportion
of creative people who are not counted among
the highly qualified, would differ from the rest
of the ‘creative class’ in such characteristics,
besides many others, as the motives for their
migration, the frequency of their migration and
the consequences of their migration. They mi-
grate less frequently, less frequently for eco-
nomic reasons, and with less significant econom-
ic consequences for the target region than is the
case with highly qualified people. Second, doubts
remain about the causality. Silicon Valley in Cal-
ifornia – high-tech region, sectoral-regional
cluster and creative region in one – is evidence
of this. During the genesis of this economic re-
gion in the 1950s the human capital developed
endogenously. Regional growth at this time was
not the result of a local environment character-
ised by tolerance or creativity, or that was par-
ticularly highly educated, but of the growth of a
small number of rapidly growing high-tech firms.
Their growth and the increasing employment op-
portunities together with classical agglomeration
economies were the main reasons for the
attraction of qualified labour in the following
phases (cf. Storper and Scott 2009).
Hypothesis 3: A greater proportion of creative
people in a region (than in other regions) in-
creases its prosperity and growth
This hypothesis, which is central to Florida’s
concept (Florida et al. 2008), uses statistical
correlations between technology, talent and
tolerance to conclude there is a causal relation-
ship between creative economies and economic
prosperity. This is a question that primarily has
to be answered empirically – and unfortunately
there is still a significant research gap here, even
though a few empirical studies have been pub-
lished recently which attempt to provide
evidence for the relationship between the crea-
tive sector and regional economic growth for
non-U.S. regions. The results for European re-
gions are mixed. Marlet and van Woerkens
(2007) demonstrated for cities in the Nether-
lands that urban economic growth could be
explained much better with the ‘creative class’
than with human capital (measured by formal
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qualification). They therefore contradict
criticism of Florida, leveled in particular by
Glaeser (2005), that it is human capital and
highly qualified people, but not creative people
as a whole, who determine the economic add-
ed value. According to Mellander and Florida
themselves (2007), in the case of Sweden, the
‘creative class’ proves to be a stronger factor
in explaining regional growth than mere human
capital or the level of qualification. The spatial
distribution of talents also correlates with the
universities, with the tolerance (i.e., in this in-
stance openness to minorities), and with the di-
versity of the urban services on offer. But the
statistical correlation varies depending on
whether the subjects are researchers, artists or
engineers. A new thesis on the growth of
French agglomerations in the 1990s (Chante-
lot 2009) appears to confirm the decisive role
of the ‘creative class’ and the correlation
between open, tolerant and diversified urban
environments and the spatial concentration of
creative people. The few empirical studies on
the subject carried out recently in Europe con-
firm Florida’s assumptions in part, but not in
full (Rutten and Gelissen 2008, Clifton 2008,
Bontje and Musterd 2009, Lorenz and Lund-
vall 2011, Boschma and Fritsch 2009, Fritsch
and Stützer 2009). In addition, they limit them-
selves to the analysis of regional aggregates
(without performing surveys among creative
people themselves) or they only encompass
very few regions that are not representative for
the entire country in question, such as the ACRE
project (cf. www.acre. socsci.uva.nl). Addition-
al case studies of individual regions and groups
of creative people are also mostly lacking, but
would be useful in view of the regionally spe-
cific nature of the problem.
Florida’s ‘bohème’ hypothesis, which refers to
the economic impulse function of so-called
‘bobos’, was first only demonstrated for the
two cities of Las Vegas and Sarasota. His most
recent empirical evidence for the increase in
the standard of living due to the high proportion
of bohemians is also based solely on U.S.
metropolises (Florida and Mellander 2010).
A test carried out for 242 U.S. metropolitan
regions showed a strong positive correlation
between the proportion of the population with
university degrees and the urban economic
growth rate between 1990 and 2000, but no
unusually high presence of the super-creative
core (Glaeser 2005). In addition, the causali-
ties are unclear and interdependence is possi-
ble: Do creative people generate economic
growth in metropolises or is it more likely that
they are attracted by the dynamic and prosper-
ous cities (caused by quite different process-
es)? There is much to suggest that several
growth factors are working in parallel and sys-
tematically, but that the ‘creative class’ alone
does not generate economic growth (see also
Donegan et al. 2008, Krätke 2010).
New firms founded by creative people repre-
sent a particular subject. According to Florida
(2005b), creative people stand out with above-
average levels of entrepreneurial activity. This
part of Florida’s hypotheses is so far empiri-
cally untested for European or even German re-
gions. Such a test would involve questioning the
empirically and theoretically well-documented
regional embeddedness of the locational iner-
tia of entrepreneurs (Stam 2007), i.e., an inno-
vative look at so-called exogenous start-ups and
founders for which the current place of
residence/work differs from the original loca-
tion of the start-up. As long as empirical re-
search does not confirm Florida’s postulation
of greater spatial mobility and disproportion-
ately high levels of entrepreneurial activity,
comprehensive creative-economy policies fo-
cusing on start-ups launched by creative peo-
ple (‘creative start-up clusters’) should not be
founded on this postulation alone. But there is
unambiguous empirical evidence from entre-
preneurship research that the number and qual-
ity of new firms launched by creative people,
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many of whom are also classed as highly qual-
ified people according to formal criteria, are
positively influenced by a creative, and mostly
by an urban, environment. A knowledge-inten-
sive region with large quantities of highly qual-
ified labour has a particularly high level of
potential for spin-out start-ups (i.e., with com-
panies as incubators) and for spin-off start-ups
(with public research and educational institu-
tions as incubators). So the creation of knowl-
edge-intensive start-ups by creative people can
at least partially be explained by economic and
other characteristics of the entrepreneur’s home
region (Sternberg 2009). Interregional and in-
ternational comparative empirical analyses
based on GEM data show that, in most countries,
due to specific agglomeration advantages some
very large metropolitan regions in particular
have higher proportions of knowledge-intensive
start-ups than the remainder of the country in
question (cf. Acs et al. 2011).
Finally, there is the important question of the
potential of the ‘creative class’: It has to be big
enough in purely quantitative terms to be able to
trigger significant growth effects at the regional
level at all. This depends directly on the defini-
tion of the ‘creative class’: By Florida’s defi-
nition (2004), it encompasses 30 % of the gain-
fully employed people in the metropolitan are-
as he analysed. By contrast, creative-economy
reports on European countries or cities that have
a more realistic and understandable classifica-
tion of creative industries and occupations come
to far smaller proportions of under 10 % (cf.,
for example, Deutscher Bundestag,2007,
BMWi 2009, Arge 2009 for the situation in Aus-
tria, or Departure 2009 for that in Vienna).
Fritsch and Stützer (2007) also calculate a pro-
portion of just 10 % for Germany overall using
Florida’s terminology. An industry that
accounts for single-digit proportions of the
regional economy in terms of employment,
gross value added or taxes can only justify
limited economic expectations.
Hypothesis 4: A creative-economy policy
that applies the Floridian ‘prescription’
will set the aforementioned mechanisms in
motion (causal nexus between policy and
creative-economy effect)
For government’s creative policy measures to be
successful they need to fulfill some necessary
conditions. To mention just some of them:
 – Knowing the target group(s) and its/their
locational preferences,
 – Availability of ex-ante empirical studies on
feasibility and creative potential of the region
(originality and genuineness),
 – Having the right locational characteristics at
the right time (given the postulated volatility
of creative people’s locational preferences!),
 – Having enough time, patience and resources
to establish a long-term strategy,
 – And finally: the target groups must be signif-
icant in size and receptive to government
policies (see next hypothesis).
In acknowledgement of the fact that there is
insufficient space here to look in detail at these
necessary conditions, it appears plausible that
not one of them is (currently) fulfilled. Initial,
necessarily very preliminary, findings for Ger-
many indicate, too, that there are both creative re-
gions with explicit and publicly visible govern-
ment policies and those without these initiatives
(at least before the emergence of the creative
sector): Hamburg is an example of the former
(cf. Hansestadt Hamburg 2009) and Offenbach
for the latter (cf. Sailer and Papenheim 2007).
If none of the necessary conditions for the
effectiveness of government creative policies
is fulfilled, maybe there are sufficient ones?
But: There are none – as for previous mantras!
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None of the necessary conditions is a suffi-
cient condition. In addition – as could not be
expected otherwise with this young policy in-
strument – the effectiveness and efficiency of
the current creativity policy instruments are
totally unknown and their supply-orientation is
doubtful (who knows what a creative person pre-
fers?). There is some empirical evidence of the
spatial distribution of creative people; Fritsch
and Stützer (2009), for example, show the
strong regional disparity in the distribution of
creative people in Germany, but such interre-
gional mapping of entire countries is still lack-
ing for creative-economy policies although
there are many creative- and/or cultural-econo-
my reports at national, regional and local level.
Even if creativity policies are successful, they
may destroy the conditions for original cultural
production by displacing artists and performers
through upgrading and increasing property val-
ues in planned creative clusters (Kong 2000). In
consequence, a policy-maker can try and may
succeed (i.e., a creative sector has emerged), but
a causal nexus between policy action and this
emergence has not yet been proven. Local con-
ditions are too specific and creative industries
are too heterogenous, thus a ‘one-creative-
script-fits-all’ strategy would be ineffective
(Gibson and Klocker 2004, Pratt 2005).
Additionally, another side-effect of a
‘successful’ government policy must not be
ignored: Focusing on creativity is not an appro-
priate government strategy for the majority of re-
gions/region types: there would be few winners,
but many losers, especially in rural regions (Mos-
sig 2011, Scott 2006). Increasing interregional
economic disparities would be the result of ‘suc-
cessful’ government support policies – the same
as for the two previous mantras.
Added to this are a range of tangible weaknesses
in previous creative-economy policies; here, too,
there are partial parallels with previous mantras.
The policy activities of some supra-local
government agencies ignore the very region-spe-
cific conditions of creativity. A patchy strategic
fit between national, regional and local govern-
ment can not be overseen (Jayne 2005) and sev-
eral attempts suffer from a “lack of theoretical
clarity in policy definitions of the creative indus-
tries” (Galloway and Dunlop 2007: 28).
So it only remains to learn from the two previ-
ous mantras: Did policies help or were they even
decisive to create a high-tech region or generate
a cluster? The answer to both questions is an
emphatic ‘no’ (see also Tab. 1). There is little
evidence that this should be different for the
instruments of creative-economy policy, as
important necessary conditions for an impact of
such policies are not fulfilled and sufficient
conditions do not exist. To date, therefore, the
principle of hope reigns in most cities with
government programmes to support creative peo-
ple: The incentives of a local creative-economy
policy according to the Floridian prescription are
expected to stop creative people in the region
from migrating away and to motivate creative
people in other regions to migrate to the region.
Hypothesis 5: Endogenous and exogenous
creative people react actively and positively
to the incentives of creative-economy policies
Here, too, a certain degree of skepticism is
called for, although there has only been very
rudimentary empirical evidence to date. While
the intellectual elite (like lawyers or some aca-
demics), i.e., the human capital part of the crea-
tive sector, can be assumed to display a certain
openness to the incentives of creative econom-
ic policies, bohemians and artists tend to be less
easy to reach by state-driven measures. In con-
trast to pure measures of cultural policy, eco-
nomically motivated instruments of a crea-
tive-economy policy can at best expect to be
met with ignorance. In some cases, however,
conscious rejection is the consequence, as is
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well-documented in connection with the strug-
gle surrounding the Gängeviertel area of Ham-
burg (cf. www.buback.de/nion), particularly
when there is a threat of gentrification and en-
dogenous creative people are to be addressed.
Markusen’s (2006, 1938) pessimistic con-
clusions, based upon the Minneapolis/St.Paul
artist scene is probably not unrealistic for oth-
er regions as well: “If certain occupational
groups are both footloose and important cat-
alysts in development, policy-makers need to
know the specifics: which groups, where do
they live, what are the criteria by which they
make their locational choices, what kinds of
employers are drawn in their wake, who are their
competitors? How do the key groups organise
themselves as an occupational or interest
group; what are their issues; and where are the
policy entry points in this process? Even when
policy-makers have sound research that enables
them to understand their own talent targets, how
do they know to which facility investments, in-
frastructure, programs, city planning tech-
niques, and cultural policies they should devote
scarce resources in order to achieve growth,
revitalisation, and equity goals?”
One last fundamental reservation should not go
unmentioned: Creativity can never be ordered,
neither by government; “the production of authen-
tic neighbourhood cultures through deliberate
public-policy interventions is a daunting if not in-
feasible task” (Peck 2005: 749f.).
7. Conclusions – Can Politicians (and
Regional Economists) Learn from the Past?
This paper has shown that the causal nexus
between explicit creative-economy policies
and economic prosperity is not particularly
probable from a theoretical conceptual per-
spective. There cannot yet be any empirical ev-
idence as most of these measures are still too
young, and any economic effects, if indeed
there are any, could only be measured in the
future. An initial summary must therefore be
that those responsible for creative-economy
policy should do everything to avoid awakening
overly optimistic expectations regarding the
economic effects. A second summary is
directed at considerations of plausibility that
are based on experience with the previous two
mantras of local economic development poli-
cy. A one-size-fits-all strategy, i.e., policies that
benefit high-tech regions or clusters, or creative
industries in general in every region, is definitely
doomed to failure and should be avoided in times
of extremely tight public funding – which is what
finances these policies. The demand should be:
More creativity for creative-economy policy
(makers)! In addition, findings to date, including
this paper, have shown that creative-economy
policies tend not to be suited to place-branding
with clear economic political goals, for which
Lange and Stöber (2008) correctly concede a
certain uncontrollability of places and
communication regarding the place.
It is now known that local politicians act under
the influence of a rather subject-specific logic.
If they want to be (re-)elected they have to de-
velop outwardly visible activities that
 – plausibly appear to serve the local economy
(i.e., create/safeguard jobs),
 – take effect quickly (at least in theory),
 – cost little, and
 – have positive economic consequences that
should be as directly associable as possible
with them as a person (and if possible with
the relevant party and government
responsible).
In the case of the last aspect, it is only the ex-ante
perspective that counts (i.e., upon adoption of the
programme): It does not matter to the policy-
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makers whether, years after implementation, the
programme was actually a success (when the
policy-maker originally responsible is usually no
longer in office), but whether or not it sounds
promising at the time the political decision is tak-
en. Policy-makers primarily want to be elected;
whether their programmes later turn out to be cor-
rect is not a decisive factor in their calculations.
Local politicians’ decisions are strongly path-
dependent: They have gained experience from
earlier mantras and learnt from them. If a new
programme is developed which is based on
supposedly successful role models from abroad,
they award funds for it and win elections. In that
respect, lessons have been learnt. These lessons
remain largely unlearnt, however, with respect to
the ex-post evaluation of the effectiveness of
these government policies – which can only be
measured in the medium and long term. In this
case local economic policy-makers, at least as a
herd, do not learn. They are far too attached to their
own parochial and competitive thinking – and the
associated political rationalities – that appears to
assure their (re-)election. But there may be
individual politicians (often with their own prac-
tical experience as entrepreneurs) who have the
stamina, the necessary charisma and the political
influence in the right places to apply the instru-
ment long enough and, as a result, possibly even
to reap the fruits of the seeds they sow.
The role of science in this process is interesting,
too. Scientists’ behavior also follows a differ-
ent logic in terms of their reputations. Some
‘only’ want to make a name for themselves, in
which case an actual or apparent new concept that
fits the current zeitgeist is ideal. This concept,
particularly when it is disputed in the scientific
community, also generates innumerable papers
which subject it to empirical testing. The many
citations increase the fame of the concept’s in-
ventor further. This mechanism can be observed
exceptionally clearly in the cases of both
Michael Porter and Richard Florida. The ma-
jority of scientists however will prefer the role
of the vehement critic of the new concept (a
particularly popular stance in the social
sciences), who will view the concept, which is
very popular in public policy, partly due to its
simplicity, and will criticise it in the form of
publications precisely because of its simplify-
ing statements. This always also entails an attack
on the now famous protagonist of the concept –
which in turn generates attention (and citations!)
for the critic. Policy-makers are not aware of
this purely academic debate, nor would they be
interested in it. They are only interested in the
now famous scientist who invented and marketed
the concept: He is the key witness to a
successful concept (particularly when the pro-
tagonist himself and his case studies are from
the United States) which can now be implement-
ed in the local policy-maker’s local area.
This paper has, of course, several limitations,
and some of them create areas for further re-
search. Up to now the empirical evidence on
policy impacts as well as the behaviour of crea-
tive people is still rather weak. The state of
knowledge makes it difficult to formulate via-
ble policy approaches (Scott 2006). Most of
Florida’s U.S. lessons are not comparable to
European regions; the same holds true for some
of his policy recommendations. In-depth empir-
ical, interregionally comparable and represent-
ative studies are needed considering the loca-
tional preferences of members of the ‘creative
class’ and their receptiveness to government pro-
grammes. Furthermore, some of the various im-
plicit and explicit causalities of the ‘creative
class’ concept are still unproven (as for clusters
and high-tech regions). The demand for empiri-
cal validation is therefore large, as this approach
is already more popular in the practice of mu-
nicipal and regional economic support than in
science, where it still lacks much before it may
be considered a well-founded theory (Scott
2006). There is a danger, therefore, that practice
is faster than research and may therefore, under
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certain circumstances, implement an approach
which has not yet been shown to be feasible in
theory and for which the empirical evidence
does not yet exist. Hence, Hospers et al.’s
(2009: 285) conclusions on cluster and clus-
ter policies do fit almost 100 % this paper’s
résumé on creative industries and the respec-
tive creative industry support policies: “[…]
cluster policy […] is a risky venture, especial-
ly when it is tried to copy the success of re-
gional ‘best practices’. Therefore, we advice
policy-makers to move away from the Silicon
Valley model and to modestly start from a place-
specific approach of ‘Regional Realism’”.
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Summary: Learning from the Past? Why ‘Creative
Industries’ can hardly be Created by Local/
Regional Government Policies
Supporting the creative economy is the new mantra of
local and regional economic policy, and not just in
Germany. With conscious or subconscious reference
to Richard Florida’s theses on the ‘creative class’
hopes are being raised everywhere that sufficient
support for creative industries would lead to a dynam-
ic economic development of cities and regions, at least
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in the medium term. This paper emphasises how little
relation these expectations bear to reality and intends
to warn local policy-makers against the lemming-like
pursuit of a supposedly successful and universally
applicable strategy. There is a danger that history will
repeat itself here. Something similar happened in
recent decades with the concepts of ‘high-tech re-
gions’ and ‘clusters’. This paper explains that crea-
tive regions can hardly be planned by policy, and why
that is the case. Some of the central arguments are the
postulated, but barely empirically demonstrated caus-
al nexus between a significant creative sector and
economic prosperity, the often lacking acceptance
among the so-called ‘bohemians’ of policies designed
to support creative industries, and the (too) low spatial
mobility of the members of that ‘class’.
Zusammenfassung: Aus der Vergangenheit lernen?
Warum ,Kreative Branchen‘ kaum durch lokale/
regionale Politiken kreiert werden können
Die Förderung der Kreativwirtschaft ist das neue
Mantra der lokalen/regionalen Wirtschaftspolitik,
nicht nur in Deutschland. Mit bewusstem oder unbe-
wusstem Bezug zu Richard Floridas Thesen der
,creative class‘ werden allerorten Hoffnungen ge-
weckt, bei hinreichender Förderung der Kreativ-
wirtschaft stelle sich wenigstens mittelfristig eine
dynamische wirtschaftliche Entwicklung von Stadt
und Region ein. Der Beitrag betont den mangelnden
Realitätsgehalt solcher Erwartungen und möchte
lokale Wirtschaftsförderer davor warnen, wie die
Lemminge einer vermeintlich erfolgreichen und
überall anwendbaren Strategie zu folgen. Hier droht
sich Geschichte zu wiederholen: Ähnliches passierte
in den letzten Jahrzehnten mit den Konzepten ‚High-
tech-Region‘ und ‚Cluster‘. Im Beitrag wird erläu-
tert, dass und warum kreative Regionen nicht poli-
tisch geplant werden können. Zu den zentralen Ar-
gumenten zählt der postulierte, aber empirisch kaum
belegte Kausalnexus zwischen einer signifikanten
Kreativwirtschaft und ökonomischer Prosperität, die
oft fehlende Akzeptanz von Kreativwirtschafts-
politiken unter den so genannten ‚Bohemiens‘ sowie
die (zu) geringe räumliche Mobilität der Kreativen.
Résumé: Des leçons du passé? Pourquoi « l’éco-
nomie créative » ne peut guère créée par des
politiques locales/régionales
L’essor d’une économie créative est considéré d’être
le nouveau mantra de la politique locale d’économie,
non seulement en Allemagne. En rapport conscient
ou inconscient avec les thèses de l’économiste
Richard Florida traitant la ‘classe créative’, des
nouveaux espoirs sont suscités partout que si l’on
faisait progresser cette économie créative, à moyen
terme un développement dynamique de l’économie
des territoires métropolitains et des communes pour-
rait être attendu. Le texte expose l’irréalité de ces
prévisions et appelle aux acteurs de développement
économique de ne pas suivre une stratégie soi-
disant prospère et applicable partout. A ce point on
aperçoit donc qu’il existe le risque d’une récurrence
de l’histoire. Prenons les cas des concepts ‘région
de haute technologie’ et ‘cluster’; quant à ces
concepts, presque les mêmes problèmes sont appa-
rues durant les dernières décennies. Le texte expli-
que pourquoi il n’est pas possible de calculer des
régions créatives d’une manière politique et l’auteur
donne quelques arguments essentiels: Première-
ment, la causalité postulée entre une économie
créative signifiante et la prospérité économique
n’était pas prouvée empiriquement. De plus, il
n’existait q’un consentement faible entre les soi-
disant « bohémiens » d’une politique locale d’éco-
nomie creative et enfin la mobilité de la classe
créative semble d’être insignificante.
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